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The basic concept of  a public/private divide in law has been used commonly todistinguish between children’s proceedings in Northern Ireland, with proceedings
involving private disputes among family members seeking some determination in relation
to childcare arrangements on the one hand, and proceedings taken by public agencies
seeking to protect the welfare of  children on the other. Despite this, and aberrating from
jurisprudence on the public/private divide in law generally,2 children’s proceedings
emanate from a distinctive statutory framework which overtly unifies many elements of
public and private law. Moreover, the crossover between public and private law measures
in many proceedings taken under that framework in practice compounds the difficulties in
describing their relationship dichotomically. Thus, much of  the debate on the nature of  the
divide and on rules relating to the exclusivity of  proceedings does not apply with equal
force in this context.3 For the purposes of  this paper, the reach of  public law has been
construed broadly to include all decisions, actions and omissions by emanations of  the
state which have an influence on the outcome of  children’s proceedings. The paper does
not seek to advance a normative position on the appropriate extent of  state involvement
in children’s proceedings.4
It should be noted at the outset that the statutory framework in question, namely the
Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (hereinafter the 1995 Order), does not eliminate
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1     PhD candidate (cmccormick15@qub.ac.uk). The author is grateful to everyone who took the time to review
this paper prior to publication.
2     O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237, [1982] 3 WLR 1096.
3     For a succinct account of  this debate as it relates to Northern Ireland, see Gordon Anthony, Judicial Review in
Northern Ireland 2nd edn (Hart 2014) ch 2.
4     For the leading analysis of  competing views on this subject, see Lorraine M Fox Harding, ‘The Children Act
1989 in Context: Four Perspectives in Child Care Law and Policy (I)’ (1991) 13(3) Journal of  Social Welfare
and Family Law 179; see also: John Eekelaar, ‘Self-Restraint: Social Norms, Individualism and the Family’
(2012) 13(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 75.
all distinctions between public and private law.5 The position is nuanced, as the first
section of  this paper seeks to explain. It will advocate the idea of  a public/private law
spectrum in children’s proceedings, in lieu of  the arguably inappropriate binary
classification used currently. The next section highlights, by way of  example, how the
binary classification of  children’s proceedings according to a simplistic public/private
divide may operate to the detriment of  the legislative aims of  the 1995 Order without
coherent justification. The example concentrates on proposals made by the second
Access to Justice Review commissioned by the Department of  Justice for Northern
Ireland6 together with proposals included in a more focused consultation on the scope of
civil legal aid carried out by the same Department.7 Both exercises proposed approaching
reform differently for public and private law children’s proceedings respectively, akin to
an analogous set of  proposals adopted by the government of  England and Wales in
2012.8 This paper will suggest that those proposals are based on a flawed understanding
of  how children’s proceedings have been legislatively designed and of  their functioning in
practice. The relevancy of  these flaws is that they appear to be rationalised by the
orthodox conception of  proceedings which divides them into the public and the private. 
It will be concluded that the concept of  a public/private divide in children’s proceedings
is being used to structure and validate cuts to state-funded legal services. It will be suggested
that the concept of  a public/private divide is a particularly inappropriate framework for
understanding children’s proceedings in this context, which ought to be displaced by a more
accurate spectral model; a model which recognises the varying degrees of  public and private
law involved in each set of  proceedings. It will be argued that, if  a spectral model were
accepted, proposals for reforming the system of  state-funded legal services for children’s
proceedings would require reconsideration, so long as the level of  state involvement in
children’s proceedings continues to be regarded as a determinative factor in legal services
policy-making. This conclusion underlines the importance of  unlocking the boundaries of
legal thought on the public/private divide insofar as it relates to children’s proceedings in
Northern Ireland, and the need to research, construct and teach an accurate theoretical
framework for understanding those proceedings.
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5     The extent to which the almost equivalent Children Act 1989 truly integrates public and private law has been
described as ‘a matter for continuing consideration’, see Richard White, Paul Carr and Nigel Lowe, The Children
Act in Practice 2nd edn (Butterworths 1995) 289. For a discussion of  the arguments for and against substantive
integration of  public and private law more broadly, see Dawn Oliver, Common Values and the Public–Private Divide
(Butterworths 1999) 248–66. See also Peter Cane, ‘Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction’ in
Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 2003) 247–76. For
a more recent analysis of  the differences between public and private law values, see David Feldman, ‘The
Distinctiveness of  Public Law’ in Mark Elliott and David Feldman (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Public Law
(CUP 2015) 17–36. For a different modern analysis, suggesting greater commonality between public and
private law, see Paul Craig, ‘Limits of  Law: Reflections from Private and Public Law’ in N W Barber, Richard
Ekins and Paul Yowell, Lord Sumption and the Limits of  Law (Hart 2016) 175–92.
6     Department of  Justice for Northern Ireland, Access to Justice Review 2: The Agenda (September 2014)
<http://www.dojni.gov.uk/index/access-to-justice-review-2-agenda-setting-document.pdf>; Department of
Justice for Northern Ireland, Access to Justice Review 2: Final Report (3 November 2015)
<www.dojni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/doj/access-to-justice-review-part-2-report.pdf>.
7     Department of  Justice for Northern Ireland, Consultation Document: Scope of  Civil Legal Aid (October 2014)
<http://www.dojni.gov.uk/index/public-consultations/archive-consultations/scope-of-civil-legal-aid-
consultation-final-document.pdf>; Department of  Justice for Northern Ireland, Post Consultation Report: Scope
of  Civil Legal Aid (March 2015) <www.dojni.gov.uk/index/public-consultations/archive-consultations/post-
consultation-report-on-scope-of-civil-legal-aid.pdf>.
8     Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of  Offenders Act 2012.
Children’s proceedings in Northern Ireland
Historically, state intervention in the interests of  children’s welfare across the UK was
once concerned with merely ‘conditioning the exercise of  paternal/parental rights’.9
However, notions of  the public interest eventually provided the rationale for greater
interventionism through social care legislation.10 This shift was driven to some
considerable extent by jurisprudence emanating from the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR),11 by the ratification of  the UN Convention on the Rights of  the
Child (UNCRC),12 by domestic case law,13 by child abuse cases highlighted in the media,14
and by various official reviews of  the law.15 The current legislative framework, having
been shaped by these varied forces, is a carefully constructed one. It was first enacted in
the form of  the Children Act 1989 (the 1989 Act) in England and Wales and subsequently
in the form of  the almost equivalent 1995 Order. The substantive law of  Northern
Ireland governing children’s welfare therefore continues to mirror that developed and
implemented in England and Wales to a large extent.
UNIFYING LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES
The 1995 Order consolidated most provisions of  family law affecting the care, upbringing
and protection of  children in Northern Ireland mainly by making the welfare of  children
a court’s paramount consideration in all proceedings.16 This paramountcy principle,
developed initially in case law,17 applies regardless of  whether a court is invited to
determine childcare arrangements by a Trust in so-called public law proceedings or by
disputing parents in so-called private law proceedings. The 1995 Order provides a non-
exhaustive welfare checklist which comprises seven specific considerations that a court
shall have regard to18 when deciding whether to make, vary or discharge an Article 8
order (generally thought of  as private law orders) or an order under Part V (generally
thought of  as public law orders).19 It has been held that this provision also satisfies the
requirements of  Article 8 of  the ECHR by ensuring that the order proposed is in
accordance with the law, necessary for the protection of  the rights and freedom of  others,
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9     Kerry O’Halloran, The Welfare of  the Child: The Principle and the Law (Ashgate 1999) 38.
10   Ibid.
11   For a discussion of  how the ECHR influenced the relevant legislation despite failure by the UK government
to incorporate it until the passage of  the Human Rights Act 1998, see Kerry O’Halloran, Family Law in
Northern Ireland (Gill & Macmillan 1997) 222–23.
12   The UK signed the Convention on 19 April 1990, ratified it on 16 December 1991, and it came into force on
15 January 1992. While it has yet to be incorporated into domestic law, Lord Kerr of  the UK Supreme Court
recently made dissenting remarks suggesting that it should nonetheless be considered directly enforceable in
domestic law, see R (SG and Others) v Secretary of  State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, [255]–[256]. Lady
Hale delivered a different opinion with similar effect, holding that the court should have regard to the UNCRC
as an aid to the construction of  the ECHR, see ibid [218], referring to Burnip v Birmingham City Council [2012]
EWCA Civ 629, [21] (Maurice Kay LJ). For a discussion of  constitutional issues raised by Lord Kerr’s
unorthodox approach to the UNCRC, see Conor McCormick, ‘Debating Constitutional Dualism’ (UK
Constitutional Law Association Blog, 24 November 2015) <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/
11/24/conor-mccormick-debating-constitutional-dualism/>.
13   Most notably Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech [1985] 3 All ER 402, as discussed in O’Halloran (n 11).
14   O’Halloran (n 11) 224–25.
15   Most notably the 1985 Review of  Child Care Law which led to The Law on Child Care and Family Services (Cmnd
62 1987) and the Law Commission’s Review of  Child Law: Guardianship and Custody (Law Com No 172 1988).
16   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 3(1).
17   J v C (An Infant) [1969] UKHL 4, [1969] 2 WLR 540.
18   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 3(3).
19   Ibid Article 3(4).
and proportionate.20 However, the primary legislative intent behind the checklist was to
help promote consistency in decision-making and to improve the overall coherence of  the
law affecting children.21
Alongside the welfare principle and its concomitant checklist, the same set of  general
principles apply to children’s proceedings. Perhaps the most important of  these is the
concept of  parental responsibility,22 defined as ‘all the rights, duties, powers,
responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of  a child has in relation to the child
and his property’.23 This concept acts as an important counterbalance to state
interventionism that might otherwise be stimulated by the welfare principle and, by
replacing the concepts of  parental rights and duties which applied previously, it loosely
implies that parental authority can only be used legally for the benefit of  the child.24 It
also enables parental authority to be temporarily discharged by persons or bodies other
than a parent. In this latter respect, the concept is reframed in a way which ‘allows it to
now play a more consistent role in both public and private family law’.25 The concept of
parental responsibility is supplemented by a duty imposed on public authorities to
promote the upbringing of  children by their families insofar as it is possible to do so
while safeguarding and protecting children’s welfare; a duty which signifies a statutory
presumption in favour of  kinship care.26 This approach furthers the idea of  shared
responsibility for children’s welfare as between the state and children’s parents – the
public sphere and the private sphere – albeit that responsibility is intended to rest
primarily with children’s parents.
The 1995 Order also enacts a no-order principle favouring non-intervention by courts
in the absence of  evidence showing that the making of  an order, be it public or private,
will improve a child’s welfare.27 Similarly, the legislation requires that courts shall have
regard to the general principle that any delay in determining the question before them is
likely to prejudice the welfare of  the child,28 and enables courts to prevent further and
unnecessary litigation at odds with a child’s welfare by requiring leave before further
applications can be made – again regardless of  whether those questions or applications
sound in public or in private law.29 It is therefore clear that these principles, consistent with
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20   Re H (Contact Order) (No 2) [2002] 1 FLR 22, 37 (Wall J).
21   O’Halloran (n 11) 237.
22   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Articles 5–7.
23   Ibid Article 6(1). 
24   O’Halloran (n 9) 82. Some have argued that the concept of  parental responsibility has been systematically
diluted by way of  judicial interpretations of  the statutory provision in England and Wales since its initial
enactment in the 1989 Act. See Peter G Harris and Robert H George, ‘Parental Responsibility and Shared
Residence Orders: Parliamentary Intentions and Judicial Interpretations’ (2010) 22 Child and Family Law
Quarterly 151.
25   O’Halloran (n 9). However, it has been highlighted that, despite a single definition of  parental responsibility,
in reality decision-making by Trusts is constrained in a way which does not apply to parents. See Brigid
Hadfield and Ruth Lavery, ‘Public and Private Law Controls on Decision-Making for Children’ (1991) 13(6)
Journal of  Social Welfare and Family Law 454.
26   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 18(1).
27   Ibid Article 3(5). It has been suggested that the use of  this presumption, among others, has been rejected by
the courts of  England and Wales and (commendably) substituted with individual assessments of  what
children’s welfare demands in a particular case. See Jonathan Herring and Oliver Powell, ‘The Rise and Fall of
Presumptions Surrounding the Welfare Principle’ (2013) 43(5) Family Law 553, 557–58.
28   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 3(2). Note that in the absence of  any real sanctions for delay
this principle is aspirational and nothing more.
29   Ibid Article 179(14). Courts are guided by a range of  factors when deciding whether or not to make an order
of  this type. See Jonathan Herring, Family Law 6th edn (Pearson Longman 2013) 508–10.
the welfare principle and the concept of  parental responsibility, are intended to give equal
shape to the discretion afforded to judicial authorities faced with the task of  conducting
children’s proceedings brought either by parents or by Trusts. This ‘underlying conceptual
unity’30 reflects the original argument made by the Law Commission in its review
preceding the 1989 Act, namely that legal ‘consistency, clarity and simplicity’ are strong
grounds for a combined approach to public and private law which affects children.31
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE LAW SPECTRUM IN CHILDREN’S PROCEEDINGS
While the unifying principles outlined above bind together public and private law in the
1995 Order to a significant degree, the legislation does preserve some ostensible
distinctions between these spheres when it comes to the types of  court orders available.
Private law orders are characterised as those which settle a contest between parents in
respect of  some childcare arrangements. Typical orders will determine, inter alia: with
whom a child will reside;32 whether the person with whom a child resides must allow the
child to visit or stay with another person, or for that person and the child otherwise to
have contact with each other;33 any steps which a person with parental responsibility is
prohibited from taking,34 such as removing a child from the jurisdiction;35 and specific
issues that may arise,36 such as where a child will attend school.37 Public law orders are
characterised as those applied for by a Trust38 which must satisfy the court that a set of
threshold criteria have been met to justify state intervention.39 The statutory threshold
stipulates that there must be reason to believe that a child is suffering, or at risk of
suffering, significant harm attributable to a lack of  parental care or to the child being
beyond parental control.40 If  satisfied that this threshold is overcome, 
. . . the court will then consider whether it is appropriate to make an order, giving
effect to the welfare and non-intervention principles enshrined in Article 3 of  the
1995 Order, and alert to its duty as a public authority under s 6 of  the Human
Rights Act 1998 and the right to family life in ECHR Article 8, with the best
interests [of  the child] the paramount consideration.41
Typical orders will require, inter alia: that a child be placed in the care of  a Trust42 (which
thereby acquires parental responsibility for the child,43 without extinguishing the parental
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30   Fox Harding (n 4) 180.
31   Review of  Child Care Law: Guardianship and Custody (n 15) paras 1.10–11.
32   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 8(1).
33   Ibid.
34   Ibid.
35   Ciaran v Niamh [2009] NIFam 18, [20] (Gillen J).
36   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 8(1).
37   Re AB (Specific Issue; Education) [2008] NIFam 2.
38   The main public bodies involved in children’s proceedings in Northern Ireland are the five Health and Social
Care Trusts; Belfast, Northern, South Eastern, Southern, and Western. They provide a range of  health and
social care services under contract with the Regional Health and Social Care Board, while the Department of
Health has overall responsibility for implementing the Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995. The
Department of  Health was named the Department of  Health, Social Services and Public Safety until the
recent passage of  the Departments Act (Northern Ireland) 2016, s 1(5). 
39   See, for example, In Re M (A Child) (Threshold Criteria – Terminal Illness) [2015] NIFam 8.
40   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 50(2).
41   Re C, A Child (Care Proceedings) [2011] NIFam 9, [80] (McCloskey J). For an overview of  the ECHR
jurisprudence applicable in this context by virtue of  the Human Rights Act 1998, see Ciaran White, Northern
Ireland Social Work Law (LexisNexis 2004) 217–23.
42   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 50(1)(a).
43   Ibid Article 52(3)(a).
responsibility of  the child’s parents);44 or that a supervising Trust worker be appointed to
advise, assist and befriend a child,45 who may direct the child to do various things46 such as
to participate in specified activities.47 These care and supervision orders can also be issued
on an interim basis48 where the court is satisfied that there are ‘reasonable grounds’ for
believing that the threshold criteria for making a full order are met.49
While this binary description of  court orders is alluringly clear, it fails to capture the
reality of  how public and private law intersect commonly in proceedings where
applications are made for one category of  court order or the other, whether by a Trust or
by a parent. It is suggested that, in discussing the nature of  state involvement in children’s
proceedings, a spectral view should be promulgated instead. Examples for six different
points on the proposed spectral model are provided below – ranging from purely private
law proceedings to purely public law proceedings – which are intended to highlight the
folly in classifying proceedings dichotomically. This model expands on the research of
Andrew Bainham, who has highlighted the hybrid nature of  many children’s proceedings
in England and Wales.50 Bainham’s insights apply with much force in Northern Ireland
too, as the examples and citations below seek to demonstrate. It should be emphasised
that the variability of  intersection between public and private law in each set of  children’s
proceedings makes the decision to identify six points on the proposed spectral model an
arbitrary one taken only in the interests of  written exposition.
Purely private law proceedings
Purely private law proceedings lie at one end of  the spectrum. These are exemplified by cases
involving a dispute between family members who are otherwise unknown to social services.
In such cases, proceedings are governed by the welfare principle and there is no need to
examine the statutory threshold criteria in order for a court to have jurisdiction to make an
appropriate order. Take, for example, the case of  a child’s parents who are disputing the
minutiae of  contact arrangements and no agreement can be reached about them out of
court.51 So long as the court does not believe that either parent is at risk of  causing harm to
the child, an application of  this nature will be decided entirely on the basis of  the welfare
principle and absent the involvement of  any public authorities. Unfortunately, there is no
data available at present to illustrate the (in)frequency of  such proceedings.
Private law proceedings containing public law elements
Then there are private law proceedings containing public law elements.52 Three examples
are specified below.
First, there are cases which involve the commissioning of  an Article 4 report.53 These
arise where the court, often acting of  its own volition, requires the relevant Trust to
arrange for a suitably qualified person, who is invariably a social worker, to report to the
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44   Ibid Article 5(5).
45   Ibid Article 54.
46   Ibid Schedule 3.
47   Ibid Schedule 3, para 2(1)(c).
48   Ibid Article 57(1).
49   Ibid Article 57(2).
50   Andrew Bainham, ‘Private and Public Children Law: An Under-Explored Relationship’ (2013) 25(2) Child and
Family Law Quarterly 138.
51   Ibid 156.
52   Ibid 140–41.
53   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 4.
court any identifiable welfare needs undisclosed by the disputing parties to private law
proceedings.54 They can be triggered by obvious animosity between the parties which
causes concerns to be raised about the nature of  care being given to the children.55 For
instance, consider the seemingly private law dispute in Re H and P between the father and
maternal uncle of  children whose mother had once lived with the maternal uncle, but had
since died.56 The father sought, inter alia, to displace a residence order in respect of  the
children that would change their residence from the maternal uncle’s abode to the father’s
abode, while the maternal uncle opposed this application and instead proposed shared
residence between himself  and the father.57 In deciding the application in the father’s
favour, Stephens J made specific reference to the Article 4 report of  a Trust which had
‘had concerns as to child protection issues’ involved in the private law proceedings.58 The
report expressed support for the father’s application, suggesting that the standard of  care
provided by the father was ‘very appropriate both physically and emotionally’59 and that
a shared residence order would be inappropriate given the distrust in existence between
the parties which was submitted as contrary to the children’s needs for stability and
security. The persuasive power of  the Article 4 report in this case illustrates how the
mechanism constructs ‘a privileged status’ or ‘a mantle of  reliability’ extended to certain
professionals (such as social workers governed by public law) who, unlike ordinary
witnesses in legal proceedings (such as family members governed by private law), are
permitted to give their opinion on any matter over which their expertise extends – such
as the parenting skills displayed by the parties.60
Second, if  there is a significant level of  concern about children’s welfare in private law
proceedings, so much so that it appears to the court that a care or supervision order may
be appropriate because the children could be suffering or at risk of  suffering significant
harm, the court may instead direct that the Trust carry out an investigation under
Article 56 of  the 1995 Order.61 The Trust must then consider, inter alia, whether it should
apply for a care or supervision order62 and provide reasons if  it decides not to.63 Notably,
where a direction has been given under Article 56, the court may make an interim care or
supervision order with respect to the child concerned if  it is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the significant harm threshold set out in Article 50(2)
is established.64 White points out that this is the only occasion where the court can make
a public law order without an application being made,65 albeit such orders are interim only.
This is perhaps the most extreme form of  interventionist public law that can feature
amidst nominally private law proceedings. However, the court is powerless to go any
further if  it disagrees with the Trust’s reported findings as it cannot interfere with the
Trust’s administrative discretion by ordering that public law proceedings be initiated. In Re
O and S,66 Gillen J was cognisant of  this limitation in finding that the court had no power
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54   Kerry O’Halloran, Child Care and Protection: Law and Practice in Northern Ireland (Thomson Round Hall 2003) 131.
55   White (n 41) 225.
56   Re H and P (Residence Application) [2011] NIFam 16.
57   Ibid.
58   Ibid [2] (Stephens J).
59   Ibid [40] (Stephens J).
60   Michael King and Christine Piper, How the Law Thinks about Children (Gower 1990) 45–47.
61   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 56.
62   Ibid Article 56(2)(a).
63   Ibid Article 56(3)(a).
64   Ibid Article 57(1).
65   White (n 41) 247.
66   Re O and S (Residence Order: Contact: Implacable Hostility) [2005] NIFam 4.
to institute public law proceedings itself  – despite the circumstances of  the case involving
a mother whose hostility towards her children having contact with their father was held to
have constituted emotional abuse and to have satisfied the significant harm threshold.67
Gillen J deferred so far as to say that the court should not ‘seek in any way to interfere with
the professional exercise of  the [T]rust’s investigative functions’.68 Contrarily, Bainham
suggests persuasively that there is a case to be made for providing courts with the power
to order a Trust to launch public law proceedings, concentrating especially on cases where
the court considers that ‘the authority’s unwillingness to issue public law proceedings has
been influenced by strategic cost-saving decisions’.69 Herring has also submitted that,
where a public authority becomes aware that a child is suffering serious abuse following a
court-ordered investigation, it is under a duty to protect the child by virtue of  the Human
Rights Act 1998.70 It might therefore be possible to argue that this duty could be
construed so as to require a Trust to apply for a care or supervision order.
Third, courts occasionally make Article 16 family assistance orders in private law
proceedings which entail the Trust making a suitably qualified person available, normally a
social worker, to ‘advise, assist and (where appropriate) befriend any person named in the
order’.71 This, of  course, constitutes a minimalist form of  state intervention – an admittedly
mild, but patently public law measure. The public nature of  the order is minimised by the
need for the consent of  all parties (including the Trust, excluding the child),72 but
maximised by the need for the circumstances warranting an order to be exceptional (such
as where a parent lacks particular skills required to care for the child).73 These requirements
make the order particularly difficult to classify, thus constituting a high-water mark in terms
of  hybrid public/private law mechanisms found in the 1995 Order.
In summary, public law elements of  private law proceedings include court-ordered
Trust investigations into children’s general welfare, court-ordered Trust investigations
into children’s welfare where the court suspects a care or supervision order may be
appropriate, and consensual family assistance orders which cause social workers to
become involved in the interests of  children’s welfare. Such elements will normally
involve a report prepared by the Trust which is likely to carry significant weight in
determining relevant private law applications. A Trust’s presence at court during the
relevant private law proceedings is also likely and, in many cases, desirable. It has been
suggested that the reason why Trusts might seek to exert influence over private law
proceedings in this way relates to a reluctance on their part to issue public law
proceedings for reasons of  cost (both in relation to the legal costs and the costs of
maintaining children in care pursuant to a care or supervision order if  that proves
necessary).74 Given a statutory preference for kinship care,75 it is perhaps unsurprising
that Trusts should wish to engineer the outcome of  private law proceedings to their own
contentment wherever possible. They may seek to achieve this by backing a private
litigant’s application through any of  the mechanisms explored above, in an attempt to
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67   Ibid [17] (Gillen J).
68   Ibid.
69   Bainham (n 50) 151. Bainham makes his suggestion in the context of  discussing the Children Act 1989, s 37,
which is equivalent to the 1995 Order, Article 56.
70   Herring (n 29) 601.
71   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article 16(1).
72   Ibid Article 16(3)(b).
73   Ibid Article 16(3)(a). See, for example, Re W [1999] 9 BNIL 40.
74   Bainham (n 50) 141.
75   Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995, Article18(1)(b).
arrange a safe outcome for the child without launching public law proceedings and
working through the public law threshold requirements that doing so would require.
However, this approach is not always successful. For example, in Re T and P, Gillen J
ordered that, in circumstances where an Article 8 residence order was sought by the father
of  children whose mother had made significantly harmful unfounded allegations of
sexual abuse against him, a care order was more appropriate despite the Trust’s support
for the father’s private law application.76
Private law proceedings converted to public law proceedings
The next point on the public/private law spectrum worthy of  discussion concerns private
law proceedings which convert completely into public law proceedings. As some of  the
cases discussed hitherto suggest, this may occur where a Trust decides that the threshold
for public law proceedings has been met while a private application is ongoing. Bainham
describes how this might arise in practice, in circumstances where a Trust may have been
supporting one parent it believed was able to raise the children while guarding against
child protection concerns in respect of  a second parent:
Let us suppose . . . that the mother is a chronic alcoholic with a record of
neglecting the children. The father, on the other hand, is seen as sufficiently able
to provide ‘good enough’ care for the child, having separated from the mother.
The authority supports a residence order to the father provided that the mother’s
contact with the child is heavily circumscribed and initially supervised. Then the
authority discovers that, contrary to its expectations, the parents have resumed
their relationship, the father is misusing drugs and both parents have been
dishonest in their dealings with the allocated social worker. In these
circumstances the authority may conclude that ‘enough is enough’ and issue
public law proceedings. The private law case is then consolidated with the public
law case, but it is the latter which will now be the dominant application before
the court. Private has turned public.77
It should be noted that, consistent with the spectral view of  children’s proceedings
advocated herein, in order for private law proceedings to convert into public law
proceedings there will normally be some varying degree of  Trust involvement in the
private law proceedings to begin with. This much belies any notion of  a clear divide
between the private and public law measures at play in such proceedings.
Purely public law proceedings
At another point on the spectrum there are children’s proceedings featuring no
recognisable elements of  private law which could rightly be classified as being matters of
purely public law. This is most obviously the case in care order applications involving
serious non-accidental injuries to children where there are no alternative carers available
or suggested by the parents and the only option is therefore long-term substitute care.78
Public law proceedings containing private law elements
Just as there can be private law proceedings with public law elements, sometimes public
law proceedings can contain private law elements. For balance, three examples of  this
nature are specified below.
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First, under the 1995 Order the National Society for the Prevention of  Cruelty to
Children (NSPCC) and any of  its officers are explicitly included within the legislative
definition of  ‘authorised persons’ who may apply for a care or supervision order.79 Given
that the NSPCC is a privately founded charity, incorporated by royal charter in 1895, it
might be thought unusual that the organisation has been empowered to intervene in
private family lives with state permission – especially when there are now dedicated public
bodies in existence for this purpose. It is also notable that the organisation’s trustees
describe one of  its purposes as ‘to prevent the public and private wrongs of  children’ on
the register of  the Charity Commission.80 White highlights rightly that this is explicable
by reference to the historical development of  the child protection regime across the UK,
which was once driven by a philanthropic effort rather than by the state.81 The associated
difficulties involved in classifying the NSPCC using a public/private dichotomy are well
demonstrated by D v National Society for the Prevention of  Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171,
wherein the House of  Lords decided, following a series of  overturned appeals below it,
that the NSPCC could rely on ‘public interest immunity’ to justify its refusal to disclose
details about the identity of  its informants as regards the ill-treatment and/or neglect of
children. This decision was reached by analogising the purposes of  the NSPCC with those
of  widely recognised public authorities such as the police. Nonetheless, as under the
orthodox view it remains a privately constituted organisation, the unique powers of  the
NSPCC to apply for nominally public law orders represent yet another iteration of  the
intersection between public and private spheres in legal proceedings affecting children’s
welfare in this jurisdiction, although such applications will, of  course, be of  a dominantly
public law nature. 
Second, by virtue of  the welfare checklist discussed above, the court must have
regard, inter alia, to the range of  powers available to it under the 1995 Order in any
particular set of  proceedings.82 Thus, as the accompanying guidance to the Order
explains, whenever the court is ‘considering whether to make, vary or discharge an order
under Part V of  the Children Order, it must consider whether a different order from the
one applied for might be more appropriate’.83 Therefore, it is open to the court on an
application for a public law care order to decide that the child’s interests would be better
served by making a private law residence order in favour of  a specified relative.84 A
determination of  this sort implicitly removes the need to establish that the public law
threshold has been met under Article 50(2).85 Moreover, the court may also make an
Article 8 order as an interim measure when a care application is pending.86 For example,
the court could make a residence order in favour of  a specified relative until the date of
the hearing in respect of  the care order application,87 though such residence orders must
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be accompanied by an interim supervision order unless the court is satisfied that the
children’s welfare will be safeguarded without one.88 In those circumstances, the court can
regulate the child’s contact with his or her parents during the interim period by making a
contact order.89 Alternatively, the court can prevent contact altogether prior to the
hearing by means of  a prohibited steps order.90
The case of  Re F and T provides a clear example of  this phenomenon in practice,
where Stephens J delivered a provisional judgment granting private law residence orders
consecutive to interim care orders put in place until it was discerned whether the mother’s
agreement would be received in respect of  certain ‘precautions’ which the judge included
in an appendix to his judgment.91 The precautions to which the mother was asked to
agree (which were, in effect, preconditions on which the private law orders depended) ranged
from agreeing to surrender her child’s passports, to arranging mental health support, to
agreeing to work openly and honestly with social services.92 The court therefore
adjourned further consideration of  any final public law care or supervision orders, while
making the interim care orders mentioned above, in order to provide the mother with an
opportunity to confirm that her children’s welfare would be ensured by the making of
private law orders with public law conditions attached. It appears inappropriate to claim
that these proceedings fall on any one side of  a public/private law divide, as they seem to
be an intertwined hybrid of  both.
Third, where a public law care plan is drawn up in favour of  a child’s family member
which is contested by another family member, for example, where a parent contests a
guardianship order in favour of  a grandparent, the final hearing can end up taking place
under the guise of  public law proceedings when they are in fact a contest between private
parties. Bainham memorably describes this sort of  scenario as ‘a private law dispute under
a public law umbrella’.93
In summary, private law elements of  public law proceedings include the power of  a
private charity to initiate public law proceedings; the availability of  so-called private law
orders to the court in public law proceedings (sometimes on an interim and/or
concurrent basis); and the occurrence of  contests between private individuals under a
public law umbrella in circumstances where there is disagreement about the provisions
made in a care plan.
Public law proceedings converted to private law proceedings
Finally, there are public law proceedings which convert completely into private law
proceedings. If  the existence and risk of  significant harm to a child has been dealt with
to the satisfaction of  the relevant Trust and the court, public law cases will almost
inevitably conclude ‘either in the child remaining with or returning to a parent, or being
entrusted to a relative’.94 Thereafter, on the expiry of  any concurrent supervision order
which may have been made as a transitionary measure, further disputes between family
members will be dealt with directly through private applications by those affected.95
***
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The crossover between public and private law measures in children’s proceedings illustrated
by these examples, together with the unifying legislative principles enshrined by the 1995
Order, show the difficulties in speaking of  a public/private divide in this context. Using a
conceptual divide as the framework for distinguishing proceedings is only useful to the
extent that it accurately describes the involvement of  the state in determining the outcome
of  those proceedings. That is to say, defining and labelling one set of  legal proceedings
‘public’ and one set ‘private’ is only justified if  the differences in state involvement between
them are clear and meaningful, thus rendering separate designations useful. By thinking
about the level of  state involvement as spectral in nature, it becomes difficult to determine
where the critical point which marks the separation between spheres on the gradient of
public/private law might defensibly lie. Therefore, as a matter of  jurisprudence, the
mismatch between terms used to describe children’s proceedings and the actual nature of
those proceedings appears to be unsatisfactory. However, as the following section will
explain, it can become a matter of  significant practical importance too when considered in
the context of  state help towards access to justice.
Capitalising on the conceptual divide
State-funded civil legal services are part of  a volatile area of  law in Northern Ireland. This
section begins by outlining the current legislation in conjunction with a brief  assessment
of  the pertinent distinctions and commonalities between rules for state-funded civil legal
services applications in relation to so-called public and private law children’s proceedings.
It then examines some further reform proposals which, it is argued, are problematised by
the spectral model for considering children’s proceedings advocated above. This
discussion will lead to the conclusion that a new way of  thinking is necessary in relation
to how the system of  accessing justice through children’s proceedings might be reformed.
CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES
Both civil and criminal legal aid used to be governed primarily by the Legal Aid, Advice
and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (hereinafter the 1981 Order) and, indeed,
most applications signed before 1 April 2015 continue to be governed by it.96 But, by the
commencement of  the Legal Aid and Coroners’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland) 2014
(hereinafter the 2014 Act), the functions and staff  of  the Northern Ireland Legal Services
Commission (NILSC) transferred to an executive agency of  the Department of  Justice
called the Legal Services Agency Northern Ireland (LSANI) and the legislation governing
civil legal aid transferred from the 1981 Order to the Access to Justice (Northern Ireland)
Order 2003 (hereinafter the 2003 Order).97 Civil legal aid has since become known as civil
legal services.98 In order to commence civil legal services, a suite of  subordinate
legislation has been made,99 exercising powers conferred on the Department of  Justice
by the 2003 Order which were vested in it in 2010.100
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This legislation governs, for the most part, applications for state funding to support
individuals who are taking, defending or party to both so-called public and private
children’s proceedings. There is a mandatory ‘merits test’ which must be satisfied,101
requiring that there must be reasonable grounds for the applicant to be involved in the
relevant proceedings,102 as well as financial eligibility requirements – which are sometimes
referred to as a ‘means test’ – establishing an allowable limit on the assessable income and
capital of  an applicant for civil legal services.103 Since the commencement of  the new
rules on 1 April 2015, there are three types of  civil legal services for cases which fall
within scope. First, there is ‘Legal Advice and Assistance’ through which funding can be
provided for advice or assistance on any matter of  law up to a cost of  £88, including all
children’s proceedings. Further work in excess of  £88 is subject to the prior authority of
LSANI.104 Second, there is ‘Representation Lower Courts’. A funding certificate of  this
kind would be appropriate if  funding for representation is required for children’s
proceedings commenced in a Magistrates’ Court, a Family Proceedings Court or a
Domestic Proceedings Court.105 Third, there is ‘Representation Higher Courts’. A
funding certificate of  this kind would be appropriate if  funding for representation is
required for children’s proceedings commenced in a County Court, a Family Care Centre,
the Court of  Appeal in Northern Ireland, or the Supreme Court of  the UK.106
Prior to 1 April 2015, there were special rules in place for some children’s proceedings
under Article 172 of  the 1995 Order, which amended the 1981 Order.107 The key provision
provided that legal aid (as it then was) had to be granted to any parent or person with
parental responsibility to cover proceedings relating to an application for: a care or
supervision order; a child assessment order; an emergency protection order, or an extension
or discharge of  an emergency protection order.108 In such cases, provided the application
was completed correctly and accepted by the NILSC (as it then was) as being within the
ambit of  Article 172, legal aid could not be refused on grounds of  means or merits. The
orders that were listed under Article 172 are classified as public law orders and were
afforded this special treatment because of  the assumption that they would necessarily
involve a high risk of  state interventionism. This assumption grounded the rationale for
state-funded legal representation as of  right. The same assumption was thought
inapplicable to private law proceedings, driven in part by the orthodox conception of  public
and private law proceedings as being clearly divided between those with and without state
involvement. Other so-called public law proceedings which were not listed under Article
172 were considered on a case-by-case basis by the application of  means and merits tests
consistent with applications relating to so-called private law proceedings. 
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However, Article 172 has been repealed109 and replaced with a slightly different
framework.110 The new regulations provide similarly that legal services shall be available
to children and persons with parental responsibility without reference to their financial
resources in, inter alia, applications for the same public law order applications which were
covered by the previous regime.111 The main difference in regimes is that a merits test will
now be applied in such applications,112 as in all other applications not excepted under the
relevant regulation,113 albeit LSANI has confirmed in writing that the merits test ‘will be
met in these cases because of  the nature of  the case’, elaborating only by referring to the
‘the parties with parental rights and the nature of  the proceedings’.114 As a result of
LSANI’s somewhat questionably fettered construction of  its new discretion, the most
recent reforms appear to have had little effect on the privileged status of  some so-called
public law proceedings in the field of  access to justice. The level of  state involvement in
determining the outcome of  proceedings continues to be recognised as a justification for
state-funded legal services, with only those proceedings which might be thought of  as
having a very high propensity for state involvement (i.e. proceedings likely to be at the
public end of  the public/private law spectrum) benefiting from exceptions in relation to
financial eligibility requirements. 
FURTHER PROPOSALS TO REFORM CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES
The Department of  Justice for Northern Ireland has considered further reforms to civil
legal services in children’s proceedings in at least two of  its recent public consultations.
Some of  the proposals made in each consultation are discussed below, followed by a brief
critique of  their shared assumptions.
First, the second Access to Justice Review (the Review), launched in September
2014115 and reported on in November 2015,116 was fundamentally driven by the goal of
developing a vision for the future of  publicly funded legal services in Northern Ireland
during a difficult economic climate. In particular, it sought to prioritise those services
where publicly funded advice and/or representation should be provided in order to meet
human rights obligations, safeguard the interests of  the vulnerable and meet the wider
public interest.117 The Review invited comment on a broad range of  proposals, but the
most pertinent for present purposes were as follows. It was suggested that the provision
of  legal services in respect of  public law children cases might be regarded as ‘part of  the
irreducible minimum of  service provision’.118 In contrast, consideration was given to
removing private family law from the scope of  legal services except where there is
objectively verifiable evidence that domestic violence or child abuse may be at stake,
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 67(2)168
109  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, Article 49(2), repeals the statutory provisions specified in
Schedule 5 to the extent specified in col 3 of  that schedule. The Children (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 is listed
in Schedule 5, with Article 172 included in col 3. This provision was commenced by the Access to Justice (2003
Order) (Commencement No 7, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order (Northern Ireland) 2015, Article 2.
110  Civil Legal Services (Financial) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015.
111  Ibid reg 4(1)(d)(i)(aa)–(dd).
112  Access to Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2003, as amended by the Legal Aid and Coroners’ Courts Act
(Northern Ireland) 2014, Article 14(2A).
113  Civil Legal Services (Financial) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2015, reg 4.
114  Email from the Legal Services Agency Northern Ireland to author (2 October 2015).
115  Access to Justice Review 2: The Agenda (n 6).
116  Access to Justice Review 2: Final Report (n 6).
117  Access to Justice Review 2: The Agenda (n 6) para 1.1.
118  Ibid para 5.5.
based closely on the reforms introduced in England and Wales in 2012.119 The agenda for
the Review noted the criticism which has followed the 2012 reforms in general terms120
and the final report cited some of  its many detailed critiques.121 By way of  example, some
criticism of  the regime has been dispensed by the judiciary of  England and Wales. In a
recent case about contact arrangements and specific issues relating to education and
health, involving litigants who would have been entitled to legal services before the 2012
reforms, Mostyn J held that it was impossible for the relevant parties to be expected to
represent themselves having regard to the factual and legal issues at large.122 He said that
to do so ‘would be a gross inequality of  arms, and arguably a violation of  their rights
under Articles 6 and 8 of  the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of
the European Charter of  Fundamental Rights’.123 The agenda for the Review also
countenanced an expanded role for mediation in private family disputes, together with
ways of  limiting the provision of  legal services in cases involving repeated applications to
the court.124
Surprisingly, the final report of  the Review recommended that all applications for legal
services should be merits tested, even those relating to so-called public law proceedings,
because in some circumstances, the report suggests, parents may not be considered a
serious or high priority for funding (for example, ‘an estranged parent who has hitherto
shown little interest in the children or the proceedings’).125 Nonetheless, so-called public
law proceedings remain privileged by the recommendations, as they suggest that the
proposed eligibility test ‘should be specific to public law proceedings’ and ‘should not
include prospects of  success criteria’,126 which are recommended in relation to so-called
private law proceedings. The proposal to remove so-called private law proceedings from
the scope of  legal services is not recommended, but the aforementioned prospects of
success criteria are, together with, inter alia, a cost–benefit test;127 financial conditions
designed to encourage earlier dispute resolution;128 a new form of  funding called an
‘Early Resolution Certificate’;129 and a range of  ‘controls’ on long-running contact
disputes, designed to make remuneration for such cases ‘significantly less generous than
for cases which resolve early’.130 Much more ‘significant’ use of  family mediation is also
recommended alongside a collection of  incentivising reforms.131 Most radically, a
feasibility study on the complete overhaul of  so-called public law proceedings is
recommended, which would place them in the hands of  an inquisitorial tribunal akin to
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the Children’s Hearing system in Scotland.132 While ‘identifying the appropriate
jurisdiction’ of  such a panel is highlighted as an issue for consideration,133 the final report
otherwise fails to acknowledge the difficulties in isolating so-called public law proceedings
for reform in the context of  the interconnected public and private law measures which
have been developed under the 1995 Order. At the time of  writing, the recommendations
of  the report were themselves subject to a public consultation. While the consultation
closed on 9 February 2016,134 its outcomes have not yet been published.
Second, a consultation on the Scope of  Civil Legal Aid (the consultation), launched
in October 2014135 and finalised in a post-consultation report in March 2015,136 was
undertaken in order to examine how best to give effect to recommendations arising from
the first Access to Justice Review which reported in September 2011137 and also ‘to
explore any other changes to the scope of  civil legal aid that will help deliver the strategic
objective of  bringing legal aid expenditure within budget’.138 The consultation also
invited comment on a broad range of  proposals, but the most pertinent for present
purposes were as follows. Consistent with the initial terms of  the Review, although
inconsistent with the recommendations of  its final report, the consultation document
categorically stated that the Department of  Justice would not be considering any
proposals that would affect either ‘Special Children Order Proceedings (cases that involve
the state taking a child into care and not subject to either a means or a merits test)’ –
which are now listed under regulation 4 of  the Civil Legal Services (Financial) Regulations
(Northern Ireland) 2015 – or ‘other public law children cases which are subject to a means
and/or merits test’.139 The consultation therefore exhibited a foregone determination not
to remove from the scope of  civil legal aid (as it then was) or to change the existing rules
in respect of  any so-called public law children’s proceedings. In contrast, the consultation
gave extensive consideration to taking so-called private law children’s proceedings out of
scope, either entirely or partially. The consultation document highlighted the criticisms
arising from analogous reforms in England and Wales, noting a range of  detrimental and
unforeseen outcomes.140 Nonetheless, an option to limit multiple private family law
applications in the same case (mirroring the Review proposal above), as well as an option
to take private children’s proceedings entirely out of  scope and to fund greater use of
mediation in its place, were both proposed by the consultation.141
The proposal to remove private cases entirely from scope was abandoned in the end,
although it was averred that the issue will be kept under review,142 following strong
opposition from respondents to the consultation who highlighted a drop in the uptake of
mediation services in England and Wales since analogous reforms were introduced,
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alongside a rise in the number of  personal litigants.143 On the other hand, the proposal
to limit the number of  multiple applications in the same so-called private law proceedings
was recommended by the consultation report and it therefore set out an intention to issue
guidance to the NILSC (as it then was) to ‘tighten up the eligibility test and introduce the
presumption that legal aid would be available for limited contact hearings only’.144 It
further noted that the guidance would require an outline of  ‘the circumstances in which
legal aid will no longer be granted, including listing any exemptions’.145 The Department
of  Justice hopes to achieve savings of  approximately £9 million per annum prospectively
as a result of  the proposed reforms.146
It is clear from both the Review and the consultation that policy on children’s
proceedings under development by the Department of  Justice is being shaped
significantly by the problematic orthodox conception of  a public/private divide. For
example, the extensive exemption of  children’s proceedings on the public side of  this
artificial divide from consideration in the context of  reforms to publicly funded legal
services is problematic to the extent that it fails to recognise how some public law
proceedings effectively become private law cases under a public law umbrella. However,
the extensive inclusion of  children’s proceedings on the private side of  the artificial divide
for consideration in respect of  proposals to make budget savings is undoubtedly more
concerning. In a case where one parent objects to contact arrangements in favour of
another parent, for example, where the favoured parent is the beneficiary of  significant
support from the relevant Trust, the prospect of  a limitation on the number of
applications that the disadvantaged parent can make with the benefit of  adequately
remunerated legal advice and representation to properly submit those applications after
the first several instances seems unlikely to ensure access to justice nor equality of  arms.
This illustrates how thinking about children’s proceedings along the lines of  a
public/private divide could mask the actual level of  state involvement in the outcome of
a particular set of  children’s proceedings, thereby undermining the rationale for
subjecting proceedings on one side of  the artificial divide to reductions in scope while
uncritically preserving the existing scheme in respect of  proceedings on the other side.
Current orthodoxy may in this way allow the state to capitalise on the conceptual divide
without coherent justification.
The department’s policy approach also raises normative concerns about the
consistency at state level regarding the appropriate extent of  the state’s role in family law
disputes.147 While such concerns lie outside the remit of  this paper’s focus, it is
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acknowledged that they are gaining increasing attention in the UK and beyond,148 where
discontent about the continued resort to misleading public/private law discourse is
growing and calls to discard that dubious distinction are spreading. 
Conclusion
A child’s future care, upbringing and protection is at risk in every set of  legal proceedings
initiated to determine those arrangements, regardless of  the level of  state involvement in
the outcome. Those issues and their resulting impact are not necessarily more or less serious
whether the proceedings are classified as public or private, but, if  the level of  state
involvement in determining their outcome is taken to be a factor of  importance in deciding
whether publicly funded legal advice and representation is justified, then a new framework
for evaluating proceedings in that light should be developed to displace the boundaries of
legal thought which prevail at present. This paper began by explaining how the legislative
design of  the 1995 Order was marked by efforts to bridge public and private law by making
children’s welfare the main organising principle when processing legal proceedings in which
they are involved. At this stage it should be clear that further reform proposals in relation
to state-funded civil legal services risk inconsistency with these legislative aims insofar as
they could entrench the notion of  a divide by bifurcating the applicable rules without
coherent justification and without regard to the overriding priority otherwise given to
children’s welfare in legal decision-making processes. It was also suggested that the
operation of  the 1995 Order in practice has delivered even greater intersection between
public and private law than has been appreciated previously, and further suggested that this
phenomenon might be better understood by promulgating a spectral model for considering
the level of  state involvement in children’s proceedings. On the basis of  that model, it is
submitted that the current approach to reforming how justice is accessed in children’s
proceedings requires reconsideration in an environment free from the constraints on legal
thought produced by a problematic public/private dichotomy. 
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